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Abstract
Cash transfer programmes have been shown to have positive effects on a variety of
outcomes. While much of the literature focuses on the role of conditionality in achiev-
ing desired impact, this paper focuses on the role of ‘soft conditionality’ implemented
through both ‘labelling’ and ‘messaging’ in evaluating the impact of the Child Grants
Program in Lesotho, an unconditional cash transfer programme targeting poor house-
holds with orphans and vulnerable children. Beneﬁciary households received a clear
message that the transfer should be spent on the interest and needs of children. Our
ﬁndings suggest that ‘soft conditionality’ does play a role in increasing expenditure
for children, especially on education, clothing and footwear. Results indicate in fact
that transfer income is spent differently from general income as it exerts both an
income and a substitution effect. This behavioural change is conﬁrmed by comparing
the ex-ante expected behaviours with the ex-post actual response to the programme.
We ﬁnd that for expenditure categories linked to the well-being of children the ex-
post response was much higher than the ex-ante expected behaviour.
Key words: cash transfers, consumption, food security, impact evaluation, soft conditionality,
behavioural change
JEL classiﬁcation: C93, D12, I38
1. Introduction
Over the past 20 years, a growing number of African governments have launched social pro-
tection programmes to provide assistance to households that are ultra-poor, labour-
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constrained, and/or caring for orphan or vulnerable children. Usually these programmes aim at
reducing poverty and vulnerability by improving consumption, nutrition, health status, school
attendance and educational outcomes.1 While most of the programmes in Latin America pro-
vide cash transfers conditional on meeting certain requirements (mainly school attendance,
regular visits to health centre for growth monitoring and updating of vaccination cards), the
majority of the cash transfer programmes in African countries are ‘unconditional’: they are
paid directly to beneﬁciary households without explicit conditions or labour requirements.
A number of papers have discussed the pros and cons of conditional cash transfers
(CCTs) as opposed to unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), from both a public and private
perspective (see, for example Handa et al. 2009; de Braw and Hoddinott, 2011; Baird et al.
2013). From the public perspective, imposing conditions may help the government to over-
come information asymmetries: government may be aware of the beneﬁts associated with
preventive healthcare or education but individuals may be unconvinced or unaware of these
beneﬁts, they may have a shorter time horizon because of lack of risk management instru-
ments, or there may be cultural barriers to investing in certain activities such as girls’ educa-
tion. From the private perspective, imposing conditionality on cash transfers can partially
solve the disagreements within households regarding the allocation of resources, strengthen-
ing the bargaining position of individuals whose preferences are aligned with the govern-
ment’s preferences, and who may otherwise lack bargaining power within the household.
Indeed, the majority of CCTs pay money preferentially to female recipients. Furthermore,
insights from behavioural economics emphasise that conditionality can impose a constraint
to those households who have hyperbolic discount functions, i.e., when they tend to choose
a smaller-sooner reward over a larger-later reward as the delay occurs sooner rather than
later in time, undertaking actions that can reduce their own welfare. In such cases, house-
holds may be better off when constraints are imposed that reduce or limit their ability to
trade-off future for present consumption (Laibson, 1997).
However, there are also drawbacks to imposing conditionality. From a public perspec-
tive, it increases the administrative costs and complexity of running a cash transfer pro-
gramme (Caldes et al. 2006). From a private perspective, imposing conditionality may
reduce the effectiveness of the targeting if the poorest households ﬁnd the conditions too
difﬁcult to meet, de facto hindering their participation to the cash transfer programme.
Moreover, imposing conditionalities may be considered paternalistic and may induce bene-
ﬁciaries to take options that are suboptimal, e.g., if returns to education are too low.
Finally, from a human right perspective, some argue against attaching conditions to the
receipt of the cash transfers, especially because the purpose of the programmes is to reduce
or mitigate the effects of extreme poverty (Freelander, 2007).
Within this debate, several contributions have sought to identify the isolated effect of
conditionality as the key feature to optimise behaviour and maximise the effectiveness of
cash transfers programmes (Bastagli et al. 2016). The results are mixed. Handa et al.
(2009) evaluate the behavioural impact of conditions on spending behaviour in rural
Mexico by the Progresa CCT program. Their results show that transfer income is not spent
on education, food and clothing differently from general income suggesting that cash trans-
fers exert only an income effect, i.e., the ‘hard conditionality’ imposed by the programme
1 For a comprehensive overview of the impacts of cash transfers programmes, see Fiszbein et al.
(2009) and Tirivayi et al. (2016).
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does not induce behavioural changes (the so called ‘substitution effect’). Teixeira et al.
(2011) evaluate the impact of the CCTs Takopora in Paraguay on healthcare utilisation
and school attendance. They exploit the heterogeneity with respect to knowledge of the
need to comply with conditionalities as identiﬁcation strategy and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant role of
‘hard conditionality’. Robertson et al. (2013) investigate the effects of CCTs and UCTs on
birth certiﬁcates, vaccine uptake and school attendance in a randomised control trial in
Zimbabwe and ﬁnd inconclusive results on the role of ‘hard conditionality’. Birth registra-
tion increased signiﬁcantly more in the CCT group, vaccine uptake increased signiﬁcantly
more in the UCT group, and no differences were detected in school attendance.
As opposed to these ﬁndings, several contributions ﬁnd that the ‘hard’ conditionality
imposed in the CCTs signiﬁcantly contribute to amplify the effects of the cash transfers on
desired outcomes. Analysing Progresa in Mexico, de Janvry et al. (2006) compare the effect
of the ‘explicit conditionality’ and a pure income effect which in their analysis simulates the
potential impact of a UCT on education. They ﬁnd that a dollar spent on CCTs would give
an effect on school enrolment eight times higher with respect to a dollar spent on increasing
household’s income. Using the same data, de Braw and Hoddinott (2011) took advantage
of the fact that some beneﬁciaries did not receive monitoring and compliance forms for a
substantial period of time after the programme was launched and, therefore, were unaware
that the transfers were conditional. They found that receiving the form and understanding
the condition exerted a stronger effect on school enrolment. Shady and Araujo (2008),
exploiting differential parental beliefs on the school attendance requirement attached to the
programme, ﬁnd similar results from the Ecuadorian program Bono de Desarrollo Umano.
Using data from a randomised control trial in Malawi, explicitly designed to evaluate the
differential impact of CCT and UCT on the school attendance rates of teenage girls, Baird
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that conditionality contributes to amplify the effects of the cash transfers
on investments in human capital (i.e., better educational and health outcomes). ‘Hard con-
ditionality’ has also been shown to matter for health behaviour outcomes. Using data from
the Colombian program Familias en Acción, Attanasio et al. (2015) estimate that children
would receive less preventive care visits if the programme was not conditional on these vis-
its. Akresh et al. (2013) conduct a randomised experiment in rural Burkina Faso to estimate
the impact of alternative cash transfer delivery mechanisms (CCTs versus UCTs) on educa-
tion. The results indicate that unconditional and CCT programmes have a similar impact,
increasing enrolment for children who are traditionally favoured by parents for school par-
ticipation, including boys, older children and higher ability children. However, the condi-
tional transfers are signiﬁcantly more effective than the unconditional transfers in
improving the enrolment of ‘marginal children’ who are initially less likely to go to school,
such as girls, younger children, and lower ability children. They conclude that conditional-
ity actually plays a critical role in beneﬁting children who are less likely to receive invest-
ments from their parents.
Overall, while most of the previous contributions focus on the role of the conditionality,
as opposed to unconditionality, we argue that the difference between CCTs and UCTs is
more nuanced for two reasons. First, as the meta-analysis by Baird et al. (2013) point out,
the level of enforcement makes an important difference when it comes to measuring the
role of ‘hard conditionality’. Second, and more relevant for this paper, many existing UCTs
impose some sort of informal or indirect conditionality (Pellerano and Barca, 2014). The
informal or indirect conditionality, often referred as ‘soft conditionality’, may occur in
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several ways. The use of cash transfers can be implicitly conditioned by policy actions that
are implemented in conjunction with the transfer. This happens, for example, when beneﬁ-
ciaries are involved in training/education sessions that provide information on the ‘best use’
of the transfers, or when community-based case management systems are put in place to
oversee the ‘good use’ of the transfer. Examples of this ‘soft conditionality’ implemented
through the messaging are the Child Grants Program (CGP) in Lesotho and the Colombian
Familias en Acción. In this latter programme beneﬁciary women are involved in training
sessions to share information about adequate child care, health and nutrition. Sometimes
the name of the transfer scheme itself signals the existence of an implicit contract between
provider and recipient as to how the resources are expected to be used. Examples of this
‘soft conditionality’ implemented through the labelling are again the CGP in Lesotho and
the Tayssir program in Morocco, a cash transfer programme aimed at increasing the rural
primary school completion rate with two main components: a ‘hard’ conditional compo-
nent in which cash transfers are paid conditional on attendance or enrolment, and a
‘labelled’ unconditional component in which cash transfers are explicitly tied to an educa-
tional goal but without requirements on attendance or enrolment.
This paper focuses on the role of ‘soft conditionality’, implemented through both ‘label-
ling’ and ‘messaging’, to evaluate the effect of the CGP in Lesotho on household total con-
sumption, food consumption, food security for children, schooling-related expenses and
school enrolment. As with many programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the transfers
are paid without imposing any kind of explicit conditionality. However, in practice recipi-
ents received at each payment round at the pay point a clear message that the cash transfer
should be spent on the interest and needs of children. The clear ‘messaging’, evidenced also
by a qualitative study (OPM, 2014), is the key feature of the programme.
Under standard models of decision-making, such ‘soft conditionality’ should have no
bearing on how the money is spent—the cash transfers should be fully fungible with other
income sources, and the programme should lead to an income effect, but not necessarily
behavioural change. However, a large body of empirical evidence reports relationships
between income sources and the resulting behavioural response (for surveys, see Fraker,
1990; Thaler, 1990; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Moreover, the behavioural economics lit-
erature suggests that ‘labelling’ the additional source of income and ‘messaging’ on the
desired use of the additional income could matter if they facilitate mental accounting
(Thaler, 1990): beneﬁciaries may consider the cash transfers as entering into a mental
account speciﬁcally addressed to the improvement of education, nutrition and health of
children, not fungible with other accounts.
Few studies investigate the role of ‘labelling’ and ‘messaging’ in consumption and educa-
tional outcomes. Benhassine et al. (2015) use data from the Tayssir programme in
Morocco to estimate the impact of the ‘labelled’ cash transfer component, which consisted
of small cash transfers made to fathers of school-aged children in poor rural communities,
not conditional on school attendance but explicitly labelled as an education support pro-
gramme. They ﬁnd evidence of large gains in school participation. Moreover, their analysis
shows that adding ‘hard conditionality’ made almost no difference in their context. On the
contrary, Edmons (2002) investigates the effect of labelling on consumption in the context
of a child beneﬁt in Slovenia but ﬁnds no evidence for it.
Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, our paper assesses the effect-
iveness of CGP in positively affecting behaviours that are meant to be inﬂuenced by the
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conditionality. Contributions on the role of social protection programmes in SSA are rapidly
growing as more data on randomised control trials become available (Davis et al. 2012). We
add to this new collection of evidence emerging from SSA by evaluating Lesotho’s CGP.
Second, the paper investigates the speciﬁc role of ‘soft conditionality’ in affecting the desired
outcomes, the improvement of the well-being of children and schooling. Unfortunately, our
identiﬁcation strategy cannot be based on an experimental design, since there is no heterogen-
eity in the implementation of the messaging. The message that the cash transfer should serve
for the improvement of the well-being of children was spread equally in all community coun-
cils and 98% of the treated households declared to be aware of the main use of the transfers.
Nevertheless, we adopt two intuitive empirical strategies that allow us to investigate
whether the CGP has changed the preferences of households in favour of outcomes that
improve the well-being of children. First, we test the hypothesis that households spend
transfer income differently from earned income. Following Handa et al. (2009), we com-
pare the marginal propensity to spend out of transfer to the marginal propensity to spend
out of income. We expect that if programme ‘soft conditionality’ is binding, and transfer
income is used to support children, then transfer income will be spent at a higher rate on
goods such as education and clothing relative to general income. Second, we compare
standard difference-in-difference (DID) programme effects with the ex-ante expected effects
given baseline expenditure elasticities to test whether the programme simply moves house-
holds along their total expenditure Engel curve or in fact shifts that curve, suggesting a
behavioural change in favour of children well-being induced by the messaging.
Moreover, we provide a comparison of the impact of the CGP on expenditure in favour
of children (clothing for children, uniform and shoes, education) in Lesotho with respect to
the impact of similar UCT programmes implemented in the same period in other African
countries included in the Transfer Project (TP).2
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the programme, data
collection and the characteristics of the evaluation sample. Section 3 presents the estimation
methods and the main results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Background and experimental design
2.1 Description of the programme, targeting and data collection
The Kingdom of Lesotho ranks 161 out of 188 countries on the United Nations Human
Development Index. Gross domestic product has grown considerably in the past two dec-
ades, at an average annual 3.9% rate (World Bank, 2014). However, agriculture has lagged
behind other sectors and about 90% of farmers depend on subsistence agriculture for their
livelihoods. Further, between 10% and 30% of the population suffers from food insecurity
(Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) and ICF Macro, 1010). Despite eco-
nomic growth, poverty rates remain high: 57% of the population are still estimated to live
below the basic needs poverty line of US$1.08 per day, and 34% below the food poverty
line of US$0.61 per day. HIV/AIDS prevalence in Lesotho is estimated to be the second
highest in the world. The epidemic has also left behind over 300,000 orphans.
2 The TP is a joint Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNICEF and University of North Carolina
effort which supports and systemises lessons from impact evaluations of cash transfer programmes
in sub-Saharan Africa (for details, see Davis et al., 2016).
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In response to the challenges of poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion, the
Government of Lesotho indicated in the National Strategic Development Plan 2012–2017
its commitment to promote social protection. An important component of the country’s
social protection response is the CGP. At the time of evaluation the CGP was implemented
in ten community councils spread across ﬁve districts (Berea, Leribe, Mafeteng, Maseru
and Qacha’s Nek).3 Initially, the CGP provided a transfer of M360 (USD 36) every quarter
to poor and vulnerable households selected through a combination of proxy means testing
(PMT) and community validation. As of April, 2013 the payment was adjusted to take into
account the family size as follows: 1–2 household members (M360), 3–4 members (M600)
and 5 and above members (M750) per quarter. The amount of cash transfers was equiva-
lent to 17% of the beneﬁciary average baseline expenditure.
The initial stated objective of the CGP is to ‘provide a social protection system through
regular and predictable cash transfers to families living with orphans or vulnerable children
(OVCs) in order to encourage, fostering and retention of OVCs within their families and
communities, and to promote their human capital development’ (Ayala Consulting, 2011).4
In practice, due to operational issues around identifying OVCs, the programme focused on
poor households with at least one child (under seventeen years) as a more appropriate tar-
geting criterion. The programme is currently managed and ﬁnanced by the Ministry of
Social Development, though during the pilot phase considered in this study the programme
received ﬁnancial support from the European Union and the technical support from the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)-Lesotho.
The CGP was designed and implemented in three phases. Phase 1 started in October
2009/April 2010 in three community councils, reaching about 1,250 households. The pilot
was expanded in early 2010 under phase 1 to include three additional councils and then
again under phase 2, covering an additional 3,400 households. Scale up during phase 3
was used to implement an impact evaluation using a randomised control trial design. First,
in each community council, public lotteries randomly selected half of all the electoral divi-
sions (EDs) into the group of cash transfers recipients, the so called treatment EDs. The
other half, excluded from the disbursement of the payments, constitute the control EDs.5
Second, in both treatment and control locations, targeting of the eligible and non-eligible
households was carried out according to a combination of PMT and community validation.
Household information was collected through a community-wide census following a com-
munity mobilisation event, where households were informed about the programme. The
collected information was used to create the National Information System for Social
Assistance (NISSA), a repository of household socio-economic information intended to be
used for future social assistance programmes by the Government of Lesotho. The PMT pre-
dicts the likelihood of a household having a certain level of consumption expenditure (used
as an indicator of poverty) based on a number of indicators of wealth such as dwelling con-
ditions, household assets and other household socio-economic characteristics. Households
3 As of August 2016, the CGP is provided to 26,681 beneﬁciary households in 36 community councils
across the 10 districts of the country.
4 OVC are deﬁned as household residents between 0 and 17 years old with at least one deceased
parent, or a parent who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill.
5 The total number of EDs was 96, a number which ensures that the randomisation was done across
a sufﬁcient number of clusters.
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were categorised into ﬁve distinct groups: ultra-poor, very poor, poor, less poor and better
off. The community validation exercise was completely independent from the PMT and
only households categorised as ‘ultra-poor’ or ‘very-poor’ by the PMT and selected by
members of their community as being the ‘poorest of the poor’, with at least one child 0–17
years old, were deﬁned eligible for the programme. This procedure was adopted in order to
limit inclusion errors as much as possible. After selection and notiﬁcation through printed
certiﬁcates, households were enrolled in the programme in July and August 2011 and the
ﬁrst payments started in September 2011. Further details on the programme, targeting pro-
cedure, randomisation and survey design can be found in Pellerano et al. (2012).
Beneﬁciary and non-beneﬁciary households were interviewed at baseline before the ﬁrst
payment, between June and August 2011, and were tracked and interviewed again at
follow-up, between June and August 2013. The two rounds of the survey took place at the
same time of the year to avoid seasonality bias.
In the same period, no accompanying intervention, speciﬁcally meant to contribute on
the direct well-being of children, took place. The only intervention that has been implemen-
ted on the same beneﬁciary households in the period 2012–2013 was the Food Emergency
Grant (FEG). It consisted on an emergency response to the poor harvest that strongly
affected household livelihood and food supply in Lesotho. The FEG took the form of a
bi-monthly top-up of 400 Maloti (200 Maloti/month) that was disbursed together with the
CGP, but in a separate envelope. While the additional transfer had certainly a positive
impact on beneﬁciaries’ income, there is no reason to expect that such intervention could
affect directly expenditure on education and/or clothing for children.
2.2 Qualitative evidence on the role of messaging
The CGP was introduced with the objective of improving the living standards of children.
As a result, beneﬁciary households were reminded at every payment date that the money
was meant for the welfare of their children and to ensure they had enough food, adequate
clothing and shoes. There was also a strong emphasis on education, particularly on school
uniforms. They were also reminded that the money was not for meeting their own needs or
for purchasing household items and furniture. All the CGP recipients interviewed during
the follow-up survey report having received instructions at the pay point to spend the
money on children.
A qualitative study reports that CGP programme ofﬁcials provided regular and consist-
ent messages to beneﬁciaries on the purpose and use of the CGP at pay points (OPM,
2014):
‘We are told by the social workers that we must buy food, clothes and school needs for our chil-
dren, not to buy household furniture.’ (beneﬁciary in Mefeteng district).
‘[We are told that] the children should look in a manner that shows they are taken care of’
(beneﬁciary in Leribe district).
The message was further reinforced by the oversighting of community members to make
sure the beneﬁciaries did not ‘misspend’ the transfer. Moreover, efforts were made to
encourage families to inform the children of the CGP’s purpose, to increase children’s
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awareness of their entitlement and right. An example of greater awareness of children is the
story of Thabo, a 13 years old, in grade 4 at primary school, reported in OPM (2014):
He explained things have changed since they started to receive the payment: ‘before we some-
times did not wear shoes, we had very old torn uniforms. Now we have clean uniforms, we can
change shoes (the school shoes he was wearing were indeed sturdy and in good condition), we
eat meat and vegetables with pap’. Now he has breakfast before school. Thabo also explained
he has a new ball to play with. He says, ‘Kese ke khona ho ja ke khore. Bopheto bo hantle’ [my
life is ﬁne because I can now afford to eat and my stomach is full]. Before, some children at
school would talk about him, saying bad things about his torn uniform. (OPM, 2014, page 48).
2.3 Characteristics of evaluation sample, attrition and balance
The baseline survey comprised 1,486 households roughly equally distributed between treat-
ment and control areas. Table 1 reports the baseline sample size by treatment group. Overall
1,353 of the 1,486 households interviewed at baseline were tracked in the follow-up study.
Sample attrition for the overall sample was therefore 9% (133 over 1,486 households not
tracked at follow-up). Further analysis shows that there were systematic differences in the
non-response to the follow-up survey between treatment and control groups (respectively,
5% and 12%). To address these issues and obtain unbiased estimates of the impact of the
programme, the sampling weights have been adjusted for selective non-response, by calculat-
ing the probability of households being retained in the sample on the basis of key household
characteristics at baseline.
Statistical test of mean differences is performed to compare baseline control and treat-
ment groups. We ﬁnd that the randomisation was accurate. Treatment and control house-
holds are comparable across household characteristics (with the exception of the number of
children aged 0–5 and the number of female adults aged 18–59 that are higher in the treat-
ment group), poverty indicators, household assets (with the exception of the proportion of
households that own pigs), and community level indicators (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
Full details on the characteristics of evaluation sample, attrition and balance are in
Pellerano et al. (2014). This paper is based exclusively on data from panel households that
were observed both at baseline and follow-up.
3. Empirical analysis
We conduct the analysis in three steps. First, we adopt a DID approach to estimate the dir-
ect impact on CGP on the outcomes that are meant to be directly affected by the ‘soft con-
ditionality’, namely i.e., household expenditure, food security (for adults and children),
schooling-related expenses and school enrolment (Section 3.1). Second, to assess the role of
Table 1: Beneﬁciary Status at Baseline
Beneﬁciary Status Area Total
Treatment Control
HH eligible for CGP 747 739 1,486
HH eligible for CGP (balanced panel) 706 647 1,353
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‘soft conditionality’, we ‘unpack’ the impact of the cash transfers from the impact of condi-
tions softly imposed through the messaging in affecting the outcomes. We adopt a direct
test of the hypothesis that households spend transfer income differently from earned
income. In particular, we estimate the ‘substitution’ (behavioural change) and ‘income
effect’ through a comparison of the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of general
income and out of cash transfers. A MPC out of transfer signiﬁcantly greater than the MPC
out of general income would suggest that ‘soft conditionality’ plays a role (Section 3.2).
Third, we further investigate the role of conditionality studying whether the CGP changed
the preferences of households in terms of their consumption behaviour, inducing relative
greater expenditure on clothing for children and school-related expenses. We compare DID
effects with ex-ante expected effects given baseline expenditure elasticities. If the pro-
gramme simply moves households along their total expenditure Engel curve (no behav-
ioural change), the ex-ante expected behaviour should line up with the ex-post actual
response of households to the programme. On the contrary, if the programme leads to a
shift of the Engel curve (behavioural change) the programme ex-ante expected behaviour in
matters related to the conditionality should be underestimated with respect to the actual
impact (Section 3.3).
3.1 Difference in difference approach
The framework for the basic analysis of the effect of CGP is based on a comparison of pro-
gramme beneﬁciaries with a group of non-beneﬁciaries serving as controls, all interviewed
before the programme began and again two years later, adopting a DID approach.
To estimate the potential impact of the programme on the variables that are meant to
be directly affected by the conditionality, or on any other variable, one would like to
observe average outcomes in treatment areas both with and without the programme. The
difference between the two would be entirely attributable to the programme, and the par-
ameter of interest, Δ, would be estimated as
E Y Y T 1 1A A1, 0,Δ = ( − | = ) ( )
where Yj,k is the outcome of interest and the two subscripts denote whether a household
lives in a treated area (j = 1) or not (j = 0) and whether the observation is collected before
receiving the cash transfers (k = B) or after (k = A). T equal to 1 (0) denotes treatment (con-
trol) areas and E denotes the expected value. The problem with this approach is that it is
impossible to observe the outcomes of interest without treatment in treatment areas and
therefore it is impossible to compute the second term on the right-hand side of (1). The
approach to this problem extensively used in the literature is to use control areas to esti-
mate the counterfactual. By comparing outcomes between treatment and control groups,
the average impacts of the cash transfer programme can be estimated under two weak
assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption states that, in the absence of the programme, there are
common time effects across treatment and control areas, i.e.,
E Y Y T E Y Y T1 0 2A B A B0, 0, 0, 0,( − | = ) = ( − | = ) ( )
The assumption speciﬁes that control households must evolve from the baseline to the
follow-up period in the same way treatments would have done had they not been treated.
Moreover, it implies that treatment and control households may be affected in the same
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way by macro shocks or by any other policy implemented simultaneously. This assumption
allows us to estimate the effects of the programme on the outcomes as
     
E Y T X E Y T X E Y T X E Y T X
E Y T X E Y T X E Y T X E Y T X
1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 0, 1, 0,
3
A B B A
A A
A
B B
B
1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 0,
’
0, 0,
’
Δ = ( | = ) − ( | = ) + ( | = ) − ( | = )
= [ ( | = ) − ( | = )] − [ ( | = ) − ( | = )]
( )
where X is the set of observable covariates at household and community level that are likely
to affect the outcome variables.
The second assumption underlying this estimator is that, if there are differences in the
outcome variables across treatment and control areas due to unobservable factors, these
are ﬁxed over time. By netting B’ out of A’, one obtains the effect of the programme on the
outcome variables.
Both assumption (2) and (3) must hold in order for the DID estimation of the pro-
gramme impact to be unbiased.
Equation (4) represents the regression equivalent of DID:
Y d CGP d d CGP d X2013 2013 4i t i t i i t i i i t, 0 1 , 2 3 , ,∑β β β β β μ= + _ + _ + ( _ ∗ _ ) + + ( )
Y represents the outcome of interest; d_CGP is a dummy equal to 1 if household received
the treatment; d_2013 is a dummy equal to 0 (1) if the observation is a baseline (follow-up)
one; d_CGP ∗ d_2013 is the interaction between the intervention and the time dummies, X
is the set of household and community baseline characteristics which includes household
demographic composition, education, age and marital status of the household head, com-
munity prices for individual items, community wages and community shocks (the full set of
covariates is reported in Table A2 in the Appendix). μi,t is an error term. As for the coefﬁ-
cients, we are mainly interested in estimating β3 which is the double difference estimator
capturing the treatment effect.
Since we are also interested in investigating whether the impact of CGP is different in
female headed households with respect to male headed households, we estimated equa-
tion (5) which represents the regression equivalent of a triple difference in outcomes (treat-
ment vs control, follow-up versus control, female headed households versus male headed
households).
Y d CGP d d CGP d
d femhd d femhd d CGP d femhd d
d femhd d CGP d X
2013 2013
2013
2013 5
i t i t i i t i
i i i t i i
i i t i i i t
, 0 1 , 2 3 ,
0 1 , 2
3 , ,
γ γ γ γ
δ δ δ
δ β μ
= + _ + _ + ( _ ⋅ _ )
+ _ + ( _ ⋅ _ ) + ( _ ⋅ _ )
+ ( _ ⋅ _ ⋅ _ ) + ∑ + ( )
In this case, we are mainly interested in estimating γ3 which is the treatment effect for male
headed households and the sum of γ3 and δ3 which represents the treatment effect for
female headed households.
We identify the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect.6
6 Unsurprisingly, the degree of compliance for picking up money was very high (93% according to
the survey response, 96% according to administrative records).
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3.1.1 Impact of CGP on total expenditure, food and non-food expenditure
In Table 2, we report our estimates of the impact of the programme on total expenditure,
food and non-food expenditure. For these outcome variables, and also for the others shown
in the following tables, we present the results in two different columns: the ﬁrst reports the
difference in difference estimates for the whole sample without considering the potential
heterogeneous impacts by gender of the household heads, i.e., β3 from equation (4); the
second column reports the DID estimates of the impact of CGP for male and female house-
hold heads, respectively, γ3 and (γ3 + δ3). In all estimates we control for a large set of
household and community characteristics listed in the Appendix (Table A2). Moreover,
estimates are adjusted using sampling weights by calculating the probability of households
being retained in the sample on the basis of key household characteristics at baseline, and
selective non-response (for details see Pellerano et al. 2014). Moreover, the signiﬁcance test-
ing accounts for clustering of standard errors due to sampling design.
Table 2 shows that the CGP had a positive effect on total and food expenditure, espe-
cially in households with female household head, and did not affect expenditure on non-
food items. While for food expenditure we are not able to disentangle which members of
the family were enjoying more food available, we believe that this will have positive effect
on food security of all members, including children. This result is indeed reﬂected on several
indicators of food security in Table 3. We consider whether the household incurred in food
shortage, the period spent in extreme shortage, whether any member of the household
(adults and children separately) had access to smaller or fewer meals, and went to sleep
hungry in the previous week. The results indicate that CGP signiﬁcantly contribute to the
Table 2: Impact of CGP on Monthly Expenditure—Maloti, Real Values (2013 Prices)
Total expenditure Food expenditure Non-food
expenditure
Household level
DID (β3) 75.795 64.186* 14.56
(1.57) (1.66) (0.66)
DID male hh (γ3) 11.167 4.805 11.157
(0.18) (0.1) (0.4)
DID female hh (γ3 + δ3) 146.980** 130.600*** 17.180
(2.76) (3.00) (0.73)
Per capita
DID (β3) 18.155* 13.981* 4.986
(1.68) (1.67) (0.90)
DID male hh (γ3) 14.766 6.192 5.139
(1.25) (0.64) (0.65)
DID female hh (γ3 + δ3) 20.865* 22.510** 4.319
(1.76) (1.97) (0.66)
Observations 2,701
Note: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective
non-response have been used. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. All regressions include
the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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Table 3: Impact of CGP on Various Indicators of Food Security
Food Shortage Average Months Extreme Shortage Smaller Meals Adults Smaller Meals Children
DID (β3) −0.046 −1.765*** −0.018 −0.065
(−1.43) (−4.45) (−0.39) (−1.38)
DID male hh (γ3) −0.06
−1.546***
−0.006 −0.035
(−1.31)
(−2.93)
(−0.10) (−0.59)
DID female hh (γ3 + δ3) −0.029
−1.989***
−0.032 −0.082
(−0.70)
(−3.82)
(−0.59) (−1.39)
Fewer Meals Adults Fewer Meals Children Went to sleep hungry Adults Went to sleep hungry
Children
DID (β3) −0.058 −0.078* −0.090** −0.053
(−1.34) (−1.65) (−2.24) (−1.34)
DID male hh (γ3) −0.027 −0.05 −0.064 0.034
(−0.45) (−0.79) (−0.98) (0.62)
DID female hh (γ3 + δ3) −0.083* −0.095 −0.161*** −0.150***
(−1.7) (−1.54) (−3.08) (−3.00)
Observations 2,705
Note: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective non-response have been used. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at
1%, 5% and 10%. All regressions include the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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reduction of the months of extreme food shortage, independently on the household head
gender, and a signiﬁcant increase in the number of meals for both adults and children, and
a reduction of both adults and children that went to bed hungry in households with female
household head.
As mentioned above, expenditure on non-food items was not affected by CGP.
However, if we distinguish different items of expenditure, we ﬁnd a heterogeneous impact
of the CGP. While it did not affect expenditure for adults’ clothing, the impact for chil-
dren’s clothing is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for both female and male headed
Table 4: Impact of CGP on Monthly Expenditure in Clothing—Maloti, Real Values (2013 Prices)
Clothing
Total Men Women Children
DID (β3) 11.207* −1.451 −1.876 13.064***
(1.92) (−1.11) (−1.22) (4.82)
DID male hh (γ3) 10.235 −2.198 −1.49 15.075***
(1.2) (−0.96) (−0.69) (4.16)
DID female hh
(γ3 + δ3)
11.909* −0.635 −2.291 10.528**
(1.87) (−0.40) (−1.04) (2.90)
Observations 2,701
Note: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective
non-response have been used. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. All regressions include
the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. Note that expenditure on clothing and footwear
does not include expenditure on school uniforms and school shoes.
Table 5: Impact of CGP on Expenditure in Other Monthly Non-Food Group Items (Excluding
Education)—Maloti, Real Values (2013 Prices)
Health Fuel Housing and Other
DID (β3) −0.121 −0.365 −9.977
(−0.04) (−0.03) (−1.19)
DID male (γ3) −0.369 −6.623 −8.109
(−0.09) (−0.48) (−0.68)
DID female (γ3 + δ3) 0.086 6.290 −12.345
(0.02) (0.46) (−1.37)
Observations 2,701
Note: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective
non-response have been used. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. All regressions include
the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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households (see Table 4).7 Furthermore, no impact is detected on expenditure on health,
fuel and housing (see Table 5). The results on expenditure on health deserve a particular
note. Public primary healthcare in Lesotho is ofﬁcially free and the cash transfer was rarely
used to pay for formal healthcare. In some cases participants in qualitative research (OPM,
2014) reported that recipients felt better able to purchase over-the-counter medicine (such
as those available from small shops without prescription), but this was not detected in the
quantitative survey.
3.1.2 Impact on CGP on school-related expenditure and school enrolment
Table 6 reports the impact of CGP on expenditure on education (total and per pupil 6–12,
13–19) as well as the impact on several school-related expenditure, including i.e., school
fees, exams fees, textbooks and photocopies, stationary and school bags, uniform and
school shoes. The results show a large and highly signiﬁcant effect on expenditure in educa-
tion. For pupils 6–12, the impact is positive and signiﬁcant for both male and female
headed households, while for pupils 13–19 the impact is signiﬁcant only for male headed
households. When we disentangle by item groups, the strongest impact is detected for
expenditure on school uniforms and shoes, for both female and male headed households.
This result is coherent with the qualitative ﬁndings in OPM (2014) which documents that
expenditure on clothing was strongly encouraged at pay point as an example of expend-
iture in favour of the well-being of children.
Table 7 shows the results for school enrolment. We consider whether the child is cur-
rently enrolled in any educational grade, distinguishing between boys and girls education.8
The results are striking and are consistent with Sebastian et al. (2016).9 CGP positively and
signiﬁcantly affect school enrolment of boys but not of girls, especially in female headed
households. Several factors can explain these ﬁndings. Poor households tend to invest more
on education of male children because the returns to education of girls for the household as
a whole is much lower than the returns to education of boys: in Lesotho, as in many other
developing countries, girls become part of the husband family and do not contribute any-
more to the maintenance of the original family. This argument is even stronger for female
headed households, mostly widow and unmarried, for which education of boys represents
their insurance for the old age.
7 Self-reporting bias on expenditure for items related to the messaging could be in principle a prob-
lem. However, we believe that in the case of the CGP impact evaluation this should not represent a
major concern. The increase in expenditure in clothing for children and uniform and shoes is not
only documented by the direct beneﬁciaries but also by community representatives, which were
mostly not CGP beneﬁciaries because they did not meet the targeting criteria. As documented in
Pellerano et al. (2014), community representatives reported CGP beneﬁciaries using the transfer for
shoes and clothing for children, and education. This was also facilitated by the fact that better
clothing for children and new uniforms and shoes are veriﬁable because they are tangible goods
visible to anyone living in the same community.
8 We also analysed the impact of CGP on school enrolment by age groups. The results are not
reported here but are available upon request.
9 Using the same data but adopting a different analytical framework, Sebastian et al. (2016) speciﬁc-
ally look at impact of CGP on children schooling, labour and time use, with a particular focus on dif-
ferentiated impacts by gender and household structure.
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Table 7: Impact of CGP on School Enrolment
Currently enrolled Currently enrolled
—boys
Currently enrolled
—girls
DID (β3) 0.036 0.063* 0.023
(1.48) (1.83) (0.69)
DID male hh (γ3) 0.047 0.052 0.057
(1.41) (1.13) (1.27)
DID female hh (γ3 + δ3) 0.026 0.078** −0.016
(0.92) (2.02) (−0.43)
Observations 2701
Note: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective
non-response have been used. ***, ** and *indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. All regressions include
the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Table 6: Impact of CGP on Schooling-Speciﬁc Expenditure Items—Maloti, Real Values (2013
Prices)
Education—Total Education—Per
Pupil 6–12
Education
Per Pupil 13–19
DID (β3) 15.941** 5.729** 6.46
(2.01) (2.81) (0.74)
DID male (γ3) 21.027** 6.127* 27.203**
(2.16) (1.89) (2.19)
DID female (γ3 + δ3) 10.01 5.316** −11.78
(0.96) (2.14) (−1.01)
Household level School fees Exam fees and other
school fees
School maintenance
DID (β3) 5.102 1.163 0.550**
(1.25) (0.89) (2.13)
DID male (γ3) 10.312* 2.059 0.287
(1.78) (1.25) (1.24)
DID female (γ3 + δ3) −0.907 0.088 0.838*
(−0.16) (0.05) (1.84)
Household level Text books and
photocopies
Stationery and school
bags
Uniform and/or school
shoes
DID (β3) −0.119 1.045 6.554***
(−0.09) (1.5) (3.23)
DID male (γ3) 0.488 1.712* 7.091***
(0.24) (1.73) (2.97)
DID female (γ3 + δ3) −0.857 0.324 5.993**
(−0.63) (0.34) (2.01)
Observations 2701
Note: Robust t-statistics clustered at the community level are in brackets. Sample weights adjusted for selective
non-response have been used. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. All regressions include
the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix.
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3.2 ‘Unpacking’ the role of programme’s conditionality
Focusing only on expenditure items, we employ an intuitively appealing approach, pro-
posed by Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) and Handa et al. (2009), to test whether ‘soft con-
ditionality’ is playing a role in affecting behaviours of beneﬁciary households. If
conditionality is binding, programme transfers will exert an income and substitution effect
on household spending behaviour, while general income only exerts an income effect on
such behaviour. If the substitution effect is big, the MPC out of transfer income for items
related to children’ well-being will be larger than the MPC out of general income; if the
substitution effect is small or zero, then the programme only exerts an income effect and
the two MPCs will be statistically equal.
We estimate the following equation:
Y CGP i d Xvalue ncome 2013 6i t i t i t i i i t, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,∑β β β β β μ= + _ + + _ + + ( )
where Y represents the logarithm of annual household expenditure of the ith household
(either total expenditure or expenditure on each of the other items), food security or school
enrolment. CGP_value is the logarithm of annual transfers from administrative data. The
variable income is the logarithm of the annual monetary income (not including the cash
transfers). X is a vector representing the same set of control variables as in (4) and (5), and
u is the error term. Expenditure, monetary income, and transfer amounts are logged to nor-
malise values and account for skewed distributions. Therefore, our equations for expend-
iture items are estimated in double logarithmic form: our hypothesis test translates into a
test of the equality of elasticities of transfers and general income. β1 represents the MPC
out of transfer income and β2 represents the MPC out of general income.
To determine if the impact of a CGP maloti is different from a monetary income maloti, we
test the following null and alternative hypothesis:
H H: : 7a0 1 2 1 2β β β β= ≠ ( )
Soft conditionality plays a role if, for outcome variables related to the conditionality, the
MPC out of transfer income (β1) is signiﬁcantly greater than the MPC out of general
income (β2). In this case, the null hypothesis will be rejected in favour of the alternative and
transfer income plays both a ‘substitution’ and an ‘income’ effect. We expect the substitu-
tion effect of the transfer income to be strongest for expenditure items related to the chil-
dren well-being that should be directly affected by the conditionality, i.e., clothing and
footwear for children and education.
The monetary income variable includes the following component (real annual values):
wage income10, income from livestock sales, income from livestock by-products sales,
income from crop sales, net proﬁt from non-agricultural activities, public transfers (exclud-
ing CGP transfers), private transfers and transfers from residents and non-residents family
members or friends. From this measure of monetary income, an important component is
missing: the value of livestock purchased. To cope with potential income underestimation
and partially solve the issue of a missing component, we added the number of livestock
10 Wage income is calculated as follows: ‘average days of work in a week’ * ‘wage level for agricul-
tural activities’ * 52 (number of weeks per year). Gender speciﬁc wage levels are taken into
account.
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purchased as additional control.11 However, the inclusion of this additional control does
not change signiﬁcantly the main results.
3.2.1 Endogeneity of household income
The income variable included in the previous analysis presents a problem of endogeneity
since income and consumption expenditure are jointly determined by the households
through the allocation of time between work and leisure. Moreover, unobserved ability or
tastes may determine both income and the allocation of that income to different consump-
tion items (food, alcohol and tobacco, schooling, etc). This unobserved heterogeneity may
cause bias estimates. In order to minimise this potential bias, we also estimate household
ﬁxed-effects models which allows to get rid of the ﬁxed unobserved household level compo-
nent. The ﬁxed-effect model generates consistent estimates under the underlying assumption
that the unobserved component affecting both earning capacity and expenditure decisions
is ﬁxed over time. We believe this is a plausible assumption given the two year time frame
used in our analysis.
3.2.2 Comparison of MPCs
Tables 9–11 present the summary results of the spending responses out of transfer and gen-
eral income. The OLS results and the household ﬁxed-effect model results are reported,
respectively, on the left-hand and right-hand columns. The analysis for total expenditure,
food expenditure and non-food expenditure is reported in Table 8. For these broad out-
come variables, the differences between the two propensities to consume on non-food items
are not statistically signiﬁcant, while for food items the MPC out of income is signiﬁcantly
greater than the MPC out of transfer. Both results seem to suggest that substitution effect is
not taking place. However, if we disentangle expenditure in non-food items in the different
components, the results are more heterogeneous. Table 9 shows the MPCs comparison for
expenditure on clothing (for male and female adults and children), health, fuel, housing
and other. The results are striking: MPCs out of general income and out of transfer on
clothing for adults, health, fuel, housing and other are not statistically signiﬁcant. On the
contrary, the MPC out of transfer on clothing for children is positive and signiﬁcantly
greater than the MPC out of income, meaning that, in this case, both a substitution and an
income effect are taking place. These results hold for both male and female headed house-
holds. We get similar results for school-related expenditure. Table 10 reports the compari-
son between MPCs for expenditure on total education and per different items (school fees,
exam fees, expenditure on uniforms and school shoes, school maintenance and expenditure
for stationery and books). These results show that a substitution effect (behavioural
change) is taking place for expenditure on education, especially for expenditure on school
uniforms and shoes.
3.3 Testing for elasticity changes
The ﬁndings presented in the previous section suggest that transfer income is spent differ-
ently than general income for items that were meant to be affected by the ‘soft-conditional-
ity’. Indeed, for clothing for children, education and especially for expenditure in school
11 We could not calculate the value of livestock purchases because data on prices were not avail-
able and we opted for adding the number of livestock purchased instead of imputing the prices.
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uniforms and shoes both an income and substitution effects (behavioural change) are taking
place. In this section, focusing only on expenditure items, we propose another test for
potential behavioural changes induced by the programme. Following The Kenya CT-OVC
Evaluation Team (2012), we unpack how the CGP has affected behaviour by using stand-
ard demand theory to predict how the programme ought to impact spending in favour of
children, based on pre-programme expenditure elasticities. Our approach consists on deriv-
ing theoretically consistent expenditure elasticities from baseline (pre-programme) and uses
these to predict household responses to the programme. The rational of this kind of ana-
lysis is the following: if the programme simply moves households along their total expend-
iture Engel curve, the ex-ante expected behaviour should line up with the ex-post actual
response of households to the programme. If this occurs, no behavioural change is taking
place and the ‘soft conditionality’ does not play any role. On the contrary, if the ex-post
actual response of households to the programme it is greater than the ex-ante expected one,
behavioural changes are taking place and ‘soft conditionality’ actually plays a role.
The principal analytical tool we use to build the baseline elasticities is the Engel curve,
which relates budget shares devoted to various spending groups to total household expendi-
tures and other households characteristics. We estimate the following speciﬁcation, com-
monly known as the Working-Leser functional form, for which applications can be found
Table 8: Soft Conditionality Results for Household Expenditure (Total, Food and Non-food)
OLS regression Fixed-effect regression
CGP
transfers
(log)
HH
income
(log)
P-value for
difference
CGP
transfers
(log)
HH
income
(log)
P-value
for
difference
Total expenditure 0.007 0.034*** 0.0002*** 0.016** 0.032*** 0.055*
(1.07) (9.29) (2.28) (6.42)
Total expenditure—MHH 0.004 0.033*** 0.0021*** 0.006 0.026** 0.112
(0.57) (5.85) 0.66 (2.76)
Total expenditure—FHH 0.011* 0.035*** 0.0051*** 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.564
(1.70) (6.58) (3.98) (5.16)
Food expenditure −0.001 0.032*** 0.000*** 0.014* 0.020*** 0.435
(−0.09) (8.35) (1.89) (3.5)
Food expenditure—MHH −0.008 0.040*** 0.000*** 0.001 0.020 0.211
(−0.99) (6.37) (0.13) (1.59)
Food expenditure—FHH 0.009 0.028*** 0.019** 0.026*** 0.023** 0.721
(1.35) (4.99) (3.43) (2.85)
Non-food expenditure 0.030*** 0.043*** 0.321 0.020* 0.057*** 0.013*
(2.95) (6.77) (1.78) (7.14)
Non-food expenditure— MHH 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.853 0.013 0.036** 0.203
(3.73) (4.24) (0.95) (2.98)
Non-food expenditure— FHH 0.022 0.050*** 0.1382 0.043*** 0.068*** 0.136
(1.58) (5.01) (3.56) (5.78)
Observations 2,701 2,701
Note: ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. The MPCs have been estimated with the inclu-
sion of the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. MHH and FHH stand for male house-
hold head and female household head, respectively.
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Table 9: Soft Conditionality Results for Non-Food Expenditure (Excluding Education)
OLS regression Fixed-effect regression
CGP
transfers
(log)
HH
income
(log)
P-value for
difference
CGP
transfers
(log)
HH income
(log)
P-value for
difference
Clothing expenditure
adult males
0 0.021** 0.1034 0.006 0.027** 0.234
(0.03) (2.46) (0.59) (2.41)
Clothing expenditure
adult males—MHH
0.003 0.031** 0.2016 0.001 0.046** 0.199
(0.19) (1.99) (0.07) (2.09)
Clothing expenditure
adult males—FHH
−0.007 0.012* 0.1662 0.027** 0.007 0.152
(−0.62) (1.99) (2.36) (0.9)
Clothing expenditure
adult females
−0.004 0.022*** 0.083 −0.019* 0.007 0.113
(−0.36) (3.02) (−1.8) (0.8)
Clothing expenditure
adult females—
MHH
0.005 0.017 0.515 −0.024 −0.003 0.395
(0.38) (1.54) (−1.44) (−0.23)
Clothing expenditure
adult females—FHH
−0.012 0.027** 0.085* −0.021 0.003 0.354
(−0.68) (2.75) (−1.26) (0.17)
Clothing expenditure
children
0.174*** 0.064*** 0.0005*** 0.188*** 0.069*** 0.002***
(6.94) (4.32) (6.05) (3.02)
Clothing expenditure
children—MHH
0.202*** 0.091*** 0.010*** 0.193*** 0.106** 0.065*
(6.25) (3.45) (5.42) (2.75)
Clothing expenditure
children—FHH
0.142*** 0.035* 0.010*** 0.206*** 0.023 0.000***
(4.28) (1.93) (5.14) (0.86)
Fuel expenditure 0.027 0.040*** 0.5642 −0.017 0.059*** 0.004***
(1.48) (3.15) (−0.85) (3.62)
Fuel expenditure—
MHH
0.026 0.041** 0.5522 −0.026 0.036 0.067*
(1.28) (2.71) (−1.17) (1.39)
Fuel expenditure—FHH 0.031 0.045** 0.6095 0.012 0.082*** 0.020**
(1.27) (2.55) (0.44) (3.66)
Health expenditure 1.067 7.371** 0.2700 −3.523 9.563** 0.017**
(0.26) (2.39) (−1.02) (2.29)
Health expenditure—
MHH
−1.534 4.357 0.4826 −3.264 12.208** 0.029**
(−0.23) (1.25) (−0.69) (2.54)
Health expenditure—
FHH
0.408 8.045* 0.1777 −3.946 9.996 0.082*
(0.10) (1.84) (−0.70) (1.69)
Housing and other
expenditure
7.251 28.233*** 0.1178 0.932 34.986*** 0.018**
(0.73) (3.42) (0.08) (4.07)
Housing and other
expenditure—MHH
18.974 22.357** 0.8514 11.339 14.941 0.859
(1.27) (2.29) (0.71) (1.15)
Housing and other
expenditure—FHH
−7.040 31.701** 0.0280 0.709 44.207*** 0.032**
(−0.61) (2.91) (0.05) (3.48)
Observations 2,701 2,701
Note: ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. The MPCs have been estimated with the inclu-
sion of the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. MHH and FHH stand for male household
head and female household head, respectively
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Table 10: Soft Conditionality Results for Schooling-Related Expenditure
OLS regressions Fixed-effect regression
CGP
transfers
(log)
HH income
(log)
P-value
for
difference
CGP
transfers
(log)
HH income
(log)
P-value
for
difference
Expenditure in education 0.127*** 0.082*** 0.082* 0.174*** 0.096*** 0.024**
(5.99) (4.82) (6.43) (3.71)
Expenditure in
education—MHH
0.111*** 0.033 0.068* 0.167*** 0.028 0.064*
(3.44) (1.25) (3.68) (0.57)
Expenditure in
education—FHH
0.154*** 0.134*** 0.643 0.214*** 0.092** 0.013**
(5.09) (5.24) (6.64) (2.46)
Exp. school fees 0.036 0.041** 0.867 0.094*** 0.067** 0.434
(1.56) (2.73) (4.00) (2.71)
Exp. school fees—MHH 0.041 −0.006 0.246 0.094*** −0.008 0.037**
(1.34) (−0.23) (3.15) (−0.23)
Exp. school fees—FHH 0.044 0.104*** 0.213 0.142*** 0.117** 0.678
(1.28) (4.15) (3.72) (2.7)
Exp. uniform/school
shoes
0.162*** 0.091*** 0.010*** 0.224*** 0.092*** 0.001***
(8.09) (4.81) (8.88) (3.39)
Exp. uniform/school
shoes - MHH
0.139*** 0.040* 0.009*** 0.239*** 0.041 0.002**
(4.70) (1.68) (5.7) (0.92)
Exp. uniform/school
shoes - FHH
0.190*** 0.126*** 0.100* 0.234*** 0.086** 0.013**
(5.93) (4.58) (6.68) (2.05)
Exp. exams fees −0.001 0.025*** 0.070* 0.007 0.035** 0.098
(−0.10) (3.04) (0.53) (2.52)
Exp. exams fees—MHH 0.008 0.273** 0.394 0.016 0.023 0.806
(0.46) (2.13) (0.87) (1.13)
Exp. exams fees—FHH −0.005 0.022** 0.192 0.017 0.046** 0.304
(−0.28) (2.18) (0.9) (1.96)
Exp. school maintenance 0.008 0.013** 0.574 0.019** 0.018 0.950
(1.00) (2.01) (2) (1.44)
Exp. school
maintenance—MHH
−0.002 0.008 0.403 0.006 −0.022 0.138
(−0.22) (0.91) (0.45) (−1.4)
Exp. school maintenance
—FHH
0.019* 0.018** 0.934 0.034** 0.047** 0.516
(1.73) (1.98) (2.59) (2.37)
Exp. stationery/school
bags
0.032* 0.067 0.151 0.064** 0.068*** 0.895
(1.70) (5.67) (2.88) (3.73)
Exp. stationery/school
bags—MHH
0.033 0.042** 0.795 0.057 0.051 0.909
(1.22) (2.14) (1.54) (1.57)
Exp. stationery/school
bags—FHH
0.038 0.094*** 0.114 0.106*** 0.066** 0.346
(1.39) (5.55) (3.74) (2.39)
Observations 2701 2701
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%. The MPCs have been estimated with the inclu-
sion of the set of control variables listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. MHH and FHH stand for male household
head and female household head, respectively
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in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980); Handa (1996) and The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation
Team (2012):
w X EXP CGPln 8i i1 2 3α β β β ε= + + ( ) + + ( )
where wi is the budget share for commodity i, EXP is household total consumption expend-
iture, CGP is a dummy variable equal to one if the household is in the treatment group,
and X is the same vector of control variables used in equation (4).
Using equation (8), the marginal effect on the budget share of a change in total house-
hold expenditure is given by equation (9), while the total elasticity expenditure can be
derived using the formula in equation (10) (Deaton et al., 1989):
w
EXPln
9i 2β
∂
∂ ( )
= ( )
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
E
w w
1 1 10i
w
EXP
i
ln 2
1
i
β= + = + ( )
∂
∂ ( )
Table 11 shows the results of equation (8) for the following expenditure items: food,
clothing (for male and female adults and children), education (uniform as special educa-
tional expenditure item), fuel, health, housing and other. The last row provides the calcu-
lated elasticities at the mean share. Panel A shows the results for the whole sample, while
panels B and C, respectively, for male and female headed households. The elasticities sug-
gest that fuel and housing are basic needs (elasticity less than one), while health, education
and clothing are luxuries (elasticity greater than one). Food has unit elasticity, a ﬁnding
that can be explained taking into account the fact that our sample is largely composed by
agricultural households that are partially able to meet their nutritional needs with home
production.
We can now predict the impact of the programme on expenditure patterns. The CGP
provides transfers that correspond to 17% of the beneﬁciaries average baseline total con-
sumption expenditure. Using the elasticity estimates in Table 11, we can predict the per-
centage change in expenditure (at the mean) for each expenditure item considered. These
are the ex-ante predicted programme impacts assuming no behavioural changes. Table 12
summarises this exercise. For example, in column 5 in panel A we estimated an elasticity
for education of 1.121 at baseline. This implies that a 17% increase in total expenditure
will result in 19.057% increase in expenditure for education (17*1.121 = 19.057), which
corresponds to 4.91 maloti when evaluated at the mean level of expenditure at baseline,
i.e., 25.75 maloti (mean level baseline expenditure*per cent increase in educa-
tion=25.75*19.057/100 = 4.91). In contrast, the actual impact of the CGP on expenditure
on education is 15.94. This means that the ex-ante simulation under-predicts expenditure
on education by 11.03 maloti. The impact of CGP is 11.03 maloti more than what we
would expect at baseline. The difference between actual CGP impact and ex-ante simula-
tion is even greater for male headed households (16.56 maloti). Overall, the results pre-
sented in Table 12 suggest that there are some important differences between actual
programme effects and what we would expect given baseline preferences of targeted house-
holds. Indeed, looking across the other household items groups, we see that actual
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Table 11: Engel Curve Estimates and Expenditure Elasticities, Pooled Baseline Sample.
Food Clothing Ad male Clothing Ad fem Clothing children Education Uniform Health Fuel Housing and other
Panel A. all sample
lnEXP 0.013* 0.002 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.002 0.008*** −0.041*** −0.003
(1.7) (3.64) (5.91) (5.64) (1.25) (0.09) (3.62) (−7.67) (−0.78)
Treatment −0.04 0.001* 0.002** 0.003** −0.002 −0.013 0.001 0.013** 0.019***
(−4.6) (1.89) (2.02) (2.44) (−0.63) (−0.61) (0.34) (2.08) (4.02)
Constant 0.632*** −0.008* −0.024*** −0.045*** −0.027 −0.052 −0.048* 0.413*** 0.129
(9.57) (−1.83) (−3.84) (−4.7) (−1.08) (−0.26) (−2.61) (9.06) (3.65)
Budget share at baseline 0.667 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.033 0.011 0.018 0.16 0.105
Elasticity 1.02 1.63 1.73 1.53 1.12 1.18 1.43 0.75 0.97
Panel B. MHH
lnEXP 0.021 0.003** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.000 −0.008 0.007** −0.044*** −0.007
(1.56) (2.76) (3.35) (4.25) (0.09) (−0.25) (2.17) (−4.62) (−0.96)
Treatment −0.050*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.005** −0.006 −0.044 0.002 0.023** 0.013
(−3.48) (2.46) (2.24) (2.65) (−1.54) (−1.47) (0.78) (2.06) (1.51)
Constant 0.599*** −0.010* −0.025*** −0.068*** 0.015 0.117 −0.060** 0.407*** 0.171**
(5.92) (−1.86) (−3.65) (−4.02) (0.46) (0.49) (−2.73) (5.09) (2.56)
Budget share at baseline 0.663 0.004 0.006 0.015 0.032 0.012 0.018 0.160 0.106
Elasticity 1.03 1.71 1.56 1.49 1.01 0.37 1.39 0.73 0.94
Panel C. FHH
lnEXP 0.005 0.001 0.005*** 0.004** 0.011** 0.022 0.008* −0.039*** 0.000
(0.33) (1.85) (3.18) (2.98) (2.11) (0.67) (1.92) (−4.13) (0.00)
Treatment −0.028* 0 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.024 −0.004 0.002 0.022**
(−1.71) (−1.1) (0.97) (0.9) (0.69) (0.94) (−0.99) (0.19) (2.91)
Constant 0.649*** −0.005* −0.029** −0.013 −0.079** −0.335 −0.032 0.423*** 0.107
(6.37) (−1.71) (−2.57) (−1.29) (−2.35) (−1.29) (−0.89) (5.44) (1.62)
Budget share at baseline 0.671 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.034 0.011 0.018 0.160 0.104
Elasticity 1.01 1.51 1.96 1.51 1.32 3.04 1.44 0.75 1.00
Note: ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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Table 12: Ex-Ante Prediction of Programme Impact on Expenditure Shares
Food Clothing Education Health Fuel Housing and other
Adults male Adults female Children Total Uniform and shoes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A. All sample
Pooled elasticity 1.020 1.628 1.730 1.532 1.121 1.176 1.426 0.746 0.970
% change in total EXP 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
% change of spending on group 17.332 27.676 29.404 26.037 19.057 19.990 24.248 12.679 16.488
mean spending at baseline 476.883 0.958 2.016 4.025 25.752 8.225 13.748 107.188 75.124
Ex-ante predicted impact 82.6520 0.2652 0.5929 1.0479 4.91 1.6441 3.3336 13.5905 12.3867
Actual DiD impact estimate 64.186 −1.451 −1.876 13.064 15.94 6.554 −0.121 −0.365 −9.977
Panel B. MHH
Pooled elasticity 1.031 1.706 1.561 1.495 1.012 0.371 1.390 0.726 0.937
% change in total EXP 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
% change of spending on group 17.535 29.001 26.535 25.410 17.212 6.309 23.638 12.337 15.931
mean spending at baseline 487.974 1.291 2.179 5.503 25.929 8.767 14.469 107.654 77.160
Ex-ante predicted impact 85.567 0.374 0.578 1.398 4.463 0.553 3.420 13.282 12.292
Actual DiD impact estimate 4.805 −2.198 −1.49 15.075 21.027 7.091 −0.369 −6.623 −8.109
Panel C. FHH
Pooled elasticity 1.01 1.51 1.96 1.51 1.32 3.04 1.44 0.75 1.00
% change in total EXP 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
% change of spending on group 17.127 25.736 33.362 25.643 22.358 51.726 24.409 12.820 17.001
Mean spending at baseline 466.149 0.636 1.859 2.594 25.581 7.699 13.050 106.737 73.153
Ex-ante predicted impact 79.836 0.164 0.620 0.665 5.719 3.982 3.185 13.684 12.437
Actual DiD impact estimate 130.6 −0.635 −2.291 10.528 10.009 5.993 0.086 6.29 −12.345
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programme impacts are lower than expected for food, clothing for male and female adults,
health, fuel and housing and other expenditure, but they are higher than expected for cloth-
ing for children, education and expenditure for school uniforms and shoes, suggesting a
behavioural change in favour of children well-being induced by the programme.
4. Comparison with other cash transfer programmes in Sub-Saharan
countries
In order to further support the evidence on the role of the ‘soft conditionality’ of the CGP,
we compare the ﬁndings on children-related expenditure (education, clothing, and uniform
and shoes) with the results of six evaluations on large-scale government UCT programmes
in Sub-Saharan African countries, conducted within the TP. We consider the following eva-
luations: Ethiopia Tigray Social Cash Transfer Pilot Program (SCTPP); Ghana Livelihood
Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP); Kenya Cash Transfers for Orphans and Vulnerable
Children (CT-OVC); Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP), Zambia Child Grant
Program (CGP), and Zimbabwe Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT).
Table 13 summarises the key components of the suite of the six evaluations, in addition
to Lesotho, and the main ﬁndings regarding children-related expenditure. Although speciﬁc
programme objectives vary, all programmes were designed with poverty-related objectives,
including the improvement of food security, health and education of children, and house-
hold resilience to negative shocks (Handa et al. 2017). One key component of all pro-
grammes reviewed here is the fact that they are unconditional. However, beside the ‘soft
conditionality’ in Lesotho, the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) program
in Ghana was originally conceived as conditional but it was never enforced, and the SCTP
in Malawi provides a ‘top-up’ beneﬁt for school-aged children, although enrolment status
was not a condition nor it is veriﬁed. The CGP in Lesotho shares with the LEAP in Ghana
the irregularity of payments. The transfer size of the CGP in Lesotho as percentage of base-
line consumption was similar to the SCTP in Malawi and the HSCT programme in
Zimbabwe.
The ﬁnal three columns of Table 13 summarise the estimated impact of the key variables
used to test the role of the ‘soft conditionality’, namely expenditure on education, expend-
iture on clothing for children, and expenditure for uniforms and shoes. The CGP in
Lesotho shares with the SCTP in Malawi the positive and signiﬁcant impact on expenditure
in education. The evaluations of the Zambian CGP document an impact on expenditure for
children’s clothing and for uniforms and shoes similar to that found for the CGP in
Lesotho.
Given the key characteristics of the programmes and the main results on the three key
variables, we conducted for Malawi the same exercise, described in Section 3.2, consisting
on the comparison between the MPC out of transfer and the MPC out of general income.
For this exercise, we use available data collected for the SCTP midline impact evaluation
(UNC, 2015). Table 14 shows the results for Malawi (panel A) and Lesotho (panel B –
same results already reported in Table 10 to facilitate the comparison): no signiﬁcant differ-
ences between the MPC out of transfers and MPC out of general income are detected for
Malawi.
Although this exercise is not meant to be exhaustive, it strengthens our main ﬁndings by
providing both a descriptive comparison between the CGP in Lesotho and similar cash
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Table 13: Comparison of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Countries
Countries Program Years of
data
collection
Target group Transfer size
(% of baseline
consumption)
Transfer type Regularity
of transfer
Exp. on education Exp. on clothing for
children
Exp. on uniform/
shoes
Lesotho Child Grant
Programme
(CGP)
2011, 2013 Poor households
with a child
under 18
years old
~17% Flat transfer until April
2013; then variable
transfer by number
of eligible HH
members
No 191.29*** Maloti
(yearly)
equivalent to
58% increase
with respect to
baseline mean
156.77*** Maloti
(yearly)
equivalent to
more than 100%
increase with
respect to
baseline mean
78.65*** Maloti
(yearly)
equivalent to
84% increase
with respect to
baseline mean
Ethiopia Tigray Social Cash
Transfer
Programme
Pilot (SCTPP)
2012, 2014 Ultra-poor,
labour-
constrained,
female or
child headed
households
with elderly,
or disabled
members
~25% Base Flat + additional
variable transfer by
number of eligible
HH members
Yes Qualitative evidence
on increase of
expenditure on
education
No signiﬁcant
change
N/A
Ghana Livelihood
Empowerment
Against
Poverty
(LEAP)
2010, 2012 Extreme poor
with elderly,
disabled or
OVC
member
~7% Variable transfer by
number of eligible
HH members
No No signiﬁcant
change
No signiﬁcant
change
N/A
Kenya Cash Transfers for
Orphans and
Vulnerable
Children
(CT-OVC)
2007, 2011 Poor households
with OVC
~22% Flat transfer Yes No signiﬁcant
change
No signiﬁcant
change
N/A
Continued
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Table 13: Continued
Countries Program Years of
data
collection
Target group Transfer size
(% of baseline
consumption)
Transfer type Regularity
of transfer
Exp. on education Exp. on clothing for
children
Exp. on uniform/
shoes
Malawi Social Cash
Transfer
Programme
(SCTP)
2013, 2015 Ultra-poor
labour-
constrained
~18% Variable transfer by
number of eligible
HH members
Yes 202.72*** Kwacha
(yearly) from
endline
evaluation
equivalent to
60% increase
with respect to
baseline mean;
197.70*** Kwacha
(yearly) from
midline
evaluation
equivalent to
59% increase
with respect to
baseline mean
N/A Qualitative evidence
on increase of
expenditure on
uniforms
Zambia Child Grant (CG)
model of the
Social Cash
Transfer (SCT)
Programme
2011, 2013 Household with
a child
under 5
years old
~27% Flat transfer Yes No signiﬁcant
change
14 pp increase
equivalent to
22% increase
with respect to
baseline mean;
33 pp increase for
shoes equivalent
to 100%
increase with
respect to
baseline mean
Zimbabwe Harmonized Social
Cash Transfer
(HSCT)
2013, 2014 Food poor and
labour-
constrained
~20% Variable transfer by
number of eligible
HH members
Yes No signiﬁcant
change
No signiﬁcant
change for
clothing
Qualitative evidence
on the increase
of expenditure
on uniforms
Note: *** indicates signiﬁcance at 1%.
Source: Adapted from Handa et al. (2017). Additional sources: Ethiopia SCTPP (Berhane et al., 2015); Ghana LEAP (Handa et al., 2014); Kenya CT-OVC (Ward et al. 2010); Malawi SCTP (UNC, 2016); Zambia CGP (AIR,
2013); Zimbabwe HSCT (AIR, 2014).
Note on years of data collection: additional rounds of data collection were undertaken in some countries, however because of comparability we report the rounds which make up the majority of estimates presented here.
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transfer programmes implemented in other Sub-Saharan countries, and a parallel with
Malawi, in which no behavioural change seems to have taken place despite the strong
impacts observed on the outcomes of interest.
5. Conclusions
This paper uses data collected for the impact evaluation of the CGP in Lesotho. We focus
on the role of ‘soft conditionality’ implemented through both ‘labelling’ and ‘messaging’ in
affecting outcomes that should be inﬂuenced by the implicit conditionality. It aims to con-
tribute to the literature on the effectiveness/appropriateness of explicit/implicit/lack (of)
conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa. The DID estimates show that the programme had a
positive impact on food expenditure, expenditure for clothing (especially for children),
school-speciﬁc expenditures (expenditure for maintenance and especially school uniforms
and shoes), food security for adults and children and school enrolment of boys.
The main contribution of this paper is our analysis of whether the programme has
shifted preferences due to the ‘soft conditionality’ implicitly imposed by the programme.
Most impact studies calculate the programme impact using a DID approach, which we pre-
sent here. However, we go further proposing two different approaches to test whether the
Table 14: Soft Conditionality Results for Expenditure in Education: Comparison Between the
CGP in Lesotho and the SCTP in Malawi
Panel A Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program
OLS regression Fixed-effect regression
SCTP
transfers (log)
HH income
(log)
P-value for
difference
SCTP
transfers (log)
HH income
(log)
P-value for
difference
Expenditure in
education
0.098*** 0.122*** 0.459 0.110*** 0.035 0.11
(8.29) (4.28) (7.71) (1.54)
Expenditure in
education—MHH
0.054** 0.085 0.675 0.064* 0.068 0.937
(2.37) (1.17) (1.94) (1.27)
Expenditure in
education—FMM
0.106*** 0.121*** 0.634 0.116** 0.039 0.110
(8.78) (4.44) (6.77) (1.02)
Panel B Lesotho Child Grant Program
OLS regression Fixed-effect regression
CGP transfers
(log)
HH income
(log)
P-value for
difference
CGP transfers
(log)
HH income
(log)
P-value for
difference
Expenditure in
education
0.127*** 0.082*** 0.082* 0.174*** 0.096*** 0.024**
(5.99) (4.82) (6.43) (3.71)
Expenditure in
education—MHH
0.111*** 0.033 0.068* 0.167*** 0.028 0.064*
(3.44) (1.25) (3.68) (0.57)
Expenditure in
education—FMM
0.154*** 0.134*** 0.643 0.214*** 0.092** 0.013**
(5.09) (5.24) (6.64) (2.46)
Note: ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.
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programme may have caused preferences to shift in favour of some goods that are meant to
be affected by the ‘soft conditionality’.
First, we test whether households spent transfer income differently from earned income
comparing the MPC out of transfers with the MPC out of general income on goods that
ought to be affected by the ‘soft conditionality’. This analysis shows that ‘soft conditional-
ity’ did play a role on outcomes most directly associated with the programme messaging
(heavily focused on well-being of children). The MPC out of transfer is indeed positive and
signiﬁcantly larger than the MPC out of general income for expenses on clothing and foot-
wear for children and expenditure on education, especially on school uniforms and shoes.
Second, we further investigate the role of ‘soft conditionality’ studying whether CGP
changed the preferences of households in terms of their consumption behaviour, inducing
relative greater expenditure on clothing for children and school-related expenses. We com-
pare DID effects with ex-ante expected effects given baseline expenditure elasticities. If the
programme simply moves households along their total expenditure Engel curve (no behav-
ioural change), the ex-ante expected behaviour should line up with the ex-post actual
response of households to the programme. Our ﬁndings show that the ex-post actual pro-
gramme effects are higher than the ex-ante expected ones for clothing for children, educa-
tion and expenditure for school uniforms and shoes, suggesting a behavioural change in
favour of children well-being induced by the programme.
In both approaches, we also explore potential gender differences on the impact of CGP
comparing male and female headed households. Our ﬁndings do not provide support for
such gender differences.
Finally, we compare the ﬁndings on children-related expenditure (education, clothing,
and uniform and shoes) with the results of six evaluations on large-scale government UCT
programs in Sub-Saharan African countries, namely Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Zambia and Zimbabwe, all designed with poverty-related objectives, including the
improvement of food security, health and education of children, and household resilience
to negative shocks. Given the key characteristics of the programmes and the main results
found on expenditure on education, clothing for children and uniforms and shoes, we con-
ducted for Malawi a comparison between the MPC out of Social Cash Transfer Program
and the MPC out of general income. We ﬁnd that in the case of Malawi, where no ‘messa-
ging’ took place, there is no behavioural change and money from the programme is used
exactly in the same way of money from general income.
Overall, our ﬁndings provide support to the effectiveness of ‘soft conditionality’.
To conclude, the results suggest two main policy implications. First, social programmes
can incentivize the achievement of the desired goals of the programme through ‘messaging’,
without necessarily imposing any explicit conditionality. Soft-conditioned programmes
tend to be administratively simpler hence less costly to implement for the government, they
also have reduced transactional costs for beneﬁciaries, due to the lack of an explicit condi-
tionality monitoring system. Second, programmes adopting a soft-conditionality approach
should carefully consider how to tailor the communication strategy to reﬂect the full array
of programme objectives. A too narrowly speciﬁed message, if effectively conveyed to the
beneﬁciaries and enforced through social monitoring, may limit the potential impact of the
programme. In the case of Lesotho the message was focused on school expenditure and
was strictly adhered to, but may have hindered impacts on other areas, such as access to
health or livelihoods diversiﬁcation. Programmes could adopt messaging and labelling
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approaches that empowers beneﬁciaries in exercising choice, including embarking in higher
risk investment that may lead to higher human capital or productivity gains in the long
run.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at Journal of African Economies online.
References
Akresh R., de Walque D., Kazianga H. (2013). Cash Transfers and Child Schooling: Evidence
from a Randomized Evaluation of the Role of Conditionality. World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 6340.
American Institutes for Research (2013) Zambia’s Child Grant Programme: 24-Month Impact
Report. Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research.
American Institutes for Research (2014) 12-Month Impact Report for Zimbabwe’s Harmonised
Social Cash Transfer Programmes. Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research.
Attanasio O., Oppedisano V., Vera-Hernández M. (2015) ‘Should Cash Transfers Be
Conditional? Conditionality, Preventive Care, and Health Outcomes’, American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 7 (2): 35–52.
Ayala Consulting (2011). Annex E—The Case Management Manual, prepared for UNICEF &
Government of Lesotho.
Baird S., Ferreira F., Özler B., Woolcock M. (2013) ‘Relative Effectiveness of Conditional and
Unconditional Cash Transfers for Schooling Outcomes in Developing Countries: A Systematic
Review’, Campbell Systematic Reviews, 8: 1–124.
Baird S., McIntosh C., Özler B. (2011) ‘Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer
Experiment’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 (4): 1709–53.
Bastagli F., Hagen-Zanker J., Harman L., Barca V., Sturge G., Schmidt T., Pellerano L. (2016).
Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review of Programme Impact and
of the Role of Design and Implementation Features. Overseases Development Institute.
Benhassine N., Devoto F., Duﬂo E., Dupas P., Pouliquen V. (2015) ‘Turning a Shove into a
Nudge? A ‘Labeled Cash Transfer’ for Education’, American Economic Journal: Economic
Policy, 7 (3): 86–125.
Berhane G., Devereux S., Hoddinott J., Hoel J., Roelen K., Abay K., Kimmel M., Ledlie N.,
Woldu T. (2015). Evaluation of the Social Cash Transfers Pilot Programme, Tigray Region,
Ethiopia, Endline Report.
Breunig R., Dasgupta I. (2005) ‘Do Intra-Household Effects Generate the Food Stamp Cash-Out
Puzzle?’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87 (3): 552–68.
Caldes N., Coady D., Maluccio J. (2006) ‘The Cost of Poverty Alleviation Transfer Programs: A
Comparative Analysis of Three Programs in Latin America’, World Development, 34 (5):
818–37.
Davis B., Gaarder M., Handa S., Yablonski J. (2012) ‘Evaluating the Impact of Cash Transfer
Programs in Sub Saharan Africa: An Introduction to the Special Issue’, Journal of
Development Effectiveness, 4: 1–8.
Davis B., Handa S., Hypher N., Rossi N. W., Winters P., Yablonski J. (2016) From Evidence to
Action: The Story of Cash Transfers and Impact Evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oxford:
FAO, UNICEF, and Oxford University Press.
29Shaping Cash Transfer Impacts Through ‘Soft-Conditions’: Evidence from Lesotho
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jae/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jae/ejy009/5046220
by San Francisco State University Library user
on 30 June 2018
de Braw A., Hoddinott J. (2011) ‘Must Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Be Conditioned to
Be Effective? The Impact of Conditioning Transfers on School Enrollment in Mexico’, Journal
of Development Economics, 96 (2): 359–70.
de Janvry A., Sadoulet E., Solomon P., Vakis R. (2006) Uninsured Risk and Asset Prediction:
Can Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Serve as Safety Nets? Social Protection Discussion
Paper 0604. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Deaton A., Muellbauer J. (1980) Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Deaton A., Ruiz J. C., Thomas D. (1989) ‘The Inﬂuence of Household Composition on
Household Expenditure Patterns: Theory and Spanish Evidence’, Journal of political economy,
97: 179–200.
Edmons E. (2002) ‘Reconsidering the Labeling Effect for Child Beneﬁts: Evidence from a
Transition Economy’, Economics Letters, 76 (3): 303–9.
Fiszbein A., Schady N., Ferreira F., Grosh M., Keleher N., Olinto P., Skouﬁas E. (2009)
Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
Fraker T. (1990) The Effects of Food Stamps on Food Consumption: A Review of the Literature.
Food and Nutrition Service. Alexandria, VA: U. S. Department of Agriculture.
Freelander N. (2007) ‘Superﬂuous, Pernicious, Atrocious and Abominable? The Case Against
Conditional Cash Transfers’, IDS Bulletin, 38 (3): 75–8.
Handa S. (1996) ‘Expenditure Behavior and Children’s Welfare: An Analysis of Female Headed
Households in Jamaica’, Journal of Development Economics, 50: 165–87.
Handa S., Daidone S., Peterman A., Davis B., Pereira A., Palermo T., Yablonski J., on behalf of
the Transfer Project (2017). Myth-busting? Confronting six common perceptions about
unconditional cash transfers as a poverty reduction strategy in Africa. Innocenti Working
Paper 2017-11, UNICEF Ofﬁce of Research, Florence.
Handa S., Park M., Darko R. O., Osei-Akoto I., Davis B., Daidone S. (2014) ‘Livelihood
Empowerment Against Poverty Program Impact Evaluation’, Carolina Population Center.
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Handa S., Peterman A., Davis B., Stampini M. (2009) ‘Opening Up Pandora’s Box: The Effect of
Gender Targeting and Conditionality on Household Spending Behavior in Mexico’s Progresa
Program’, World Development, 37 (6): 1129–42.
Haveman R., Wolfe B. (1995) ‘The Determinants of Children’s Attainments: A Review of
Methods and Findings’, Journal of Economic Literature, 33: 1829–78.
Laibson D. (1997) ‘Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting’, The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112 (2): 443–78.
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) and ICF Macro (2010). Lesotho Demographic
and Health Survey 2009.Maseru, Lesotho: MOHSW and ICF Macro.
Oxford Policy Management (OPM) (2014) Qualitative Research and Analyses of the Economic
Impacts of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lesotho Country Case Study
Report. Report Prepared for the From Protection to Production Project. Rome: Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Pellerano L., Barca V. (2014). Does One Size Fit All? The Conditions for Conditionality in Cash
Transfers. Oxford Policy Management Working Paper, Oxford: OPM.
Pellerano L., Hurrell A., Kardan A., Barca V., Hove F., Beazley R., Modise B., MacAuslan I.,
Dodd S., Crawfurd L. (2012). The Lesotho Child Grants Programme Impact Evaluation:
Targeting and baseline evaluation report. Commissioned by UNICEF/FAO for the
Government of Lesotho, Maseru.
30 Noemi Pace et al.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jae/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jae/ejy009/5046220
by San Francisco State University Library user
on 30 June 2018
Pellerano L., Moratti M., Jakobsen M., Bajgar M., Barca V. (2014) The Lesotho Child Grants
Program Impact Evaluation: Follow-up Report. Report Prepared for UNICEF-Lesotho, with
EU Funding and Technical Support from FAO. Oxford: OPM.
Robertson L., Mushati P., Eaton J. W., Dumba L., Mavise G., Makoni J., Schumacher C., Crea
T., Monasch R., Sherr L., Garnett G. P., Nyamukapa C., Gregson S. (2013) ‘Effects of
Unconditional and Conditional Cash Transfers on Child Health and Development in
Zimbabwe: A Cluster Randomised Trial’, Lancet, 381 (9874): 1283–92.
Sebastian A., De la O., Campos A. P., Daidone S., Davis B., Niang O., Pellerano L. (2016)
Gender Differences in Child Investment Behavior among Agricultural Households: Evidence
from the Lesotho Child Grants Program. Wider Working Paper, forthcoming. Helsinki:
United Nations University.
Shady N., Araujo M. C. (2008) ‘Cash Transfers, Conditions, and School Enrollment in Ecuador’,
Economia (Pontiﬁcia Universidad Catolica del Peru. Departamento de Economia), 8 (2):
43–70.
Shady N., Rosero J. (2008) ‘Are Cash Transfers Made to Women Spent Like Other Sources of
Income?’, Economics Letters, 101: 246–8.
Teixeira C., Soares F. V., Ribas R., Silva E., Hirata G. (2011) Externality and behavioral Change
Effects of a Non-randomized CCT Program: Heterogeneous Impact on the Demand for
Health and Education. Working paper 82. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth,
UNDP.
Thaler R. (1990) ‘Saving, Fungibility and Mental Accounts’, Journal of Economic Perspectives,
4: 183–205.
The Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team (2012) ‘The Impact of the Kenya Cash Transfer Program
for Orphans and Vulnerable Children on household spending’, Journal of Development
Effectiveness, 4 (1): 9–37.
Tirivayi N., Knowles M., Davis B. (2016) The interaction between social protection and agricul-
ture: A review of evidence. Global Food Security, forthcoming.
University of North Carolina (UNC) (2015) Malawi Social Cash Transfer Programme Midline
Impact Evaluation Report. Chapel Hill, NC.
University of North Carolina (UNC) (2016) Malawi Social Cash Transfer Programme Endline
Impact Evaluation Report. Chapel Hill, NC.
Ward P., Hurrell A., Visram A., Riemenschneider N., Pellerano L., O’Brien C., MacAuslan I.,
Willis J. (2010) Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC),
Kenya. Operational and Impact Evaluation, 2007-2009. Final Report. Oxford: Oxford Policy
Management.
World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators. From Data Catalog: http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
31Shaping Cash Transfer Impacts Through ‘Soft-Conditions’: Evidence from Lesotho
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jae/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jae/ejy009/5046220
by San Francisco State University Library user
on 30 June 2018
